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ABSTRACT. In this article, I argue that Hegel’s concept of recognition and
Levinas’ concept of responsibility complement each other and lead to the
idea  of  an  asymmetrical  reciprocity  in  which  the  origin  of  our  social
relations is not mutual equality, but rather mutual inequality. I will unfold
this  argument  in  three  steps.  I  will  first  work  out  a  fundamental
asymmetry  of  recognition  in  Hegel  by  means  of  the  figure  of  the
bondsman  before  elucidating  in  a  second  step  the  asymmetry  of
responsibility in Levinas by means of the figure of the hostage. In the last
and third step, I will correlate both asymmetries and show how far the
asymmetry of recognition and the asymmetry of responsibility constantly
develop from and transition into one another in our social relationships. 
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Although Hegel and Levinas may be considered two central figures
for theories of intersubjectivity, there is little research on connections
between the two.1 I would like to productively correlate their theories
and  show  that  their  fundamental  concepts  – recognition  and
responsibility  –  complement  each other.  My proposition  is  that  we
should consider the primal scene of sociability, following Hegel and
Levinas, starting from the idea of asymmetrical reciprocity: The origin of
our  social  relations  is  not  mutual  equality,  but  rather  mutual
inequality. In order to develop this thought, I will draw on those two
fundamental  figures  by  Hegel  and  Levinas  that  display  our
asymmetrical  relationship  with  others  with  particular  sharpness,
namely  the  figure  of  the  bondsman and the  figure  of  the  hostage.
Being a bondsman or being a hostage are, as I will show, more than
just  pathological  forms  of  intersubjective  relationships;  they  rather
provide the fundamental forms of how we relate to others. Being a
subject  always means being  subject  to in a double sense:  by way of
being dependent upon the recognition of others as well as by way of
being exposed to the responsibility for others.
Hegel’s  and  Levinas’  theories  of  intersubjectivity  started  gaining
greater attention in the 1990s. Authors such as Charles Taylor,  Axel
Honneth, Judith Butler, Jacques Derrida, Zygmunt Bauman and Simon
Critchley have contributed to the fact that theories of recognition and
responsibility now belong to the core of social philosophy. In the light
of  their  interpretations,  at  least  three  differences  between  both
theoretical traditions strike the eye. The first concerns the normative
measures  of  what can be  considered a  successful  form of  sociality.
Both theories are based upon very different ideas of the latter: While,
from the perspective of the theory of recognition, social exchange is
mainly  about  approving the  other’s  identity,  the  perspective  of  the
theory  of  responsibility  focuses  on  respecting  the  otherness  of  the
1 Cf.  BERNASCONI 2005,  BESNO 2007,  PAGES 2011,  PEPERZAK 2007,  2010,  REY 2006,
LIEBSCH/KEINTZEL 2010.
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other.  Where  the  former   contemplates  recognition  as  based  upon
some kind of identification, the latter contemplates it as renouncing
identification.  The  second  difference  concerns  the  process  of
subjectification. Both traditions agree in that the genesis of subjectivity
must  be  thought  as  starting  from  a  communication  process.  They
disagree,  however,  with  regard  to  the  question  as  to  how  this
communication  process  is  to  be  imagined.  Where  the  theory  of
recognition starts from the subject and its desire for recognition, the
theory of responsibility starts  from the demand of the other.  While
subjectivation for the former thus means rediscovering oneself in the
other, for the latter it means discovering the other within oneself. A
third point of controversy, finally, is the question as to how the social
bond  is  structured.  Where  the  theory  of  recognition  assumes  a
symmetry  of  social  relations,  the  theory  of  alterity  assumes  an
insurmountable asymmetry of social  relations.  While intersubjective
relationships are structured according to the principle of mutuality for
one theoretical tradition, the other assumes a unilateralism between
the ‘I’ and the other. 
There  are,  as  we  can  see,  wide-ranging  differences  between  the
theory of recognition and the theory of responsibility. They cannot be
seamlessly translated into one another. Any attempt to correlate them
faces  the  challenge  of  having  to  take  a  position  regarding  these
oppositions. There are at least three ways to proceed: The first chooses
a comparative  approach and examines which one of both traditions is
more suitable to appropriately comprehend social relations and then
decides  for  one  or  the  other.2 The  second  way  is  based  upon  an
integrative approach which tries to dissolve the oppositions between
the two traditions by showing that aspects of one theory can be found
in the other.3 The third way, lastly, which I will pursue in this paper,
follows  a  complementary approach.  It  shows  that  the  theory  of
recognition and the theory of alterity do not oppose but rather refer to
2 Cf. HONNETH 2008. 
3 Cf.  DÜTTMANN 2000.  STAEHLER 2016  emphasises  the  methodological  kinship  between
Hegel’s phenomenology and the phenomenological tradition following Husserl. 
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one another mutually, in such a way that each of them can only be
reasonably understood in conjunction with the other.4 This approach
has  the  advantage,  I  believe,  that  it  neither  has  to  compare  what
cannot be compared, nor does it level out both traditions. It instead
preserves  the  independence  of  both  theoretical  traditions  in  their
opposition by way of showing their correlation.
In  the  following,  I  would  like  to  develop  the  proposition  of  the
asymmetrical reciprocity of social relations in three steps. I will first
work out a fundamental asymmetry of recognition in Hegel by means
of the figure of the bondsman (1) before illucidating in a second step
the asymmetry of responsibility in Levinas by means of the figure of
the  hostage  (2).  In  the  last  and  third  step,  I  will  correlate  both
asymmetries and show as to in how far the asymmetry of recognition
and  the  asymmetry  of  responsibility  constantly  develop  from  and
transition  into  one  another  in  our  social  relationships.  My  final
conclusion will be that sociality is not to be understood as per sample
of symmetrical, but rather as per sample of asymmetrical reciprocity
(3).  
1.  The  Asymmetry  of  Recognition:  Hegel  and  the
Figure of the Bondsman
Hegel’s  Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1807, can be considered
an important milestone in his thought regarding recognition, for here
he makes the process of recognition result in the relation of lordship
and  bondage  for  the  first  time.  The  common argument  is  that,  by
reference to the dialectic of lordship and bondage, Hegel shows that
relationships of mutual recognition can only be realised in reciprocal
and symmetrical relations. In contrast to this classical interpretation, I
would like to argue that what Hegel actually illustrates by reference to
the figure of the bondsman is a constant asymmetry of recognition. In
order  to  develop  this  idea,  we have  to  bring  to  mind the  point  in
4 Cf. BEDORF 2010. 
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Hegel’s  argumentation  where  he  first  introduces  the  relation  of
lordship  and  bondage.  Before  illustrating  my  alternative
interpretation,  I  will  first  briefly  outline  what  I  call  the  classical
interpretation.5 
The  classical  interpretation  reads  the  relation  of  lordship  and
bondage  as  the  result  of  a  struggle  for  recognition.  The  two
protagonists that Hegel puts in the centre of his thought concerning
the constitution of self-consciousness are in a relation of irreconcilable
disaccord,  which  unavoidably  leads  to  this  struggle.  Each  of  them
assumes his being superior to the other and taking a favoured place in
the world. As long as none of the two is willing to resign his  self-
concept,  a  conflict  develops  from  this  discord,  ending  in  the  very
moment in which it escalates from a simple competition to a fight to
the  death.  Hegel  says:  «Thus the  relation of  the  two self-conscious
individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a
life-and-death struggle.»6 In  the  light  of  such  a  death  struggle,  the
protagonists react in very different ways. While one looks death in the
eye without any fear, the other caves in at death’s door. Where one
subject is willing to give up on its claim for superiority and to instead
surrender to the claim for superiority of the other when facing death,
the other subject appears unperturbed by the death threat – it instead
holds  on  to  its  claim  for  superiority.  According  to  the  classical
interpretation,  this  holding  on  to  its  own  conviction  is  the  crucial
achievement  of  what  will  for  Hegel  later  be  the  lord.  While  the
bondsman clings to life and remains thus chained to his animal-like
nature,  the  lord  is  able  to  overcome  the  latter.  He  outmasters  his
creaturely passions, instincts and fears and manages to keep up the
image that he has of himself. Put otherwise: He would rather die for
his beliefs  than giving them up and living in chains.  It  is not until
taking up this attitude, according to Hegel, that man stays aloof from
his animal-like existence. This thought becomes clear in another work
where  Hegel  speaks of  suicide:  «The human being alone is  able to
5 I have developed this thought in detail in HERRMANN 2012. 
6 HEGEL 1977, 113-4f.
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abandon all  things,  even his  own life.»7 Human existence comes to
itself  in the lord because for him the humane dimension of his  life
with its  values,  beliefs  and mindsets  outvalues  his  creaturely being
and the needs, desires and affects coming with it. 
My alternative interpretation of the lordship and bondage relation
assumes  that  the  struggle  for  recognition  is  more  complex  than
posited by the classical interpretation. This begins with the fact that in
the  Phenomenology,  the struggle is  not  abandoned before one of  the
participants dies (as Hegel had stated in earlier writings during his
time  in  Jena),  but  instead  fought  out  until  the  very  end.  For  the
protagonists,  the  fight  to  the  death  does  not  remain  a  mere
anticipation; it becomes bitter reality. One subject initially survives the
struggle as the winner before then deciding to bow to the other as the
bondsman. I believe it is crucial to consider this process in order to
understand as to why Hegel makes the struggle for recognition result
in the lordship and bondage relation in the Phenomenology for the first
time: It enables him to show in how far recognition may become the
reason of inequality and asymmetrical dependency. 
Let us thus review again what Hegel says: In the Phenomenology, we
follow the development of the self-consciousness that survives because
it has killed the other. Hegel himself makes very clear that the history
of experience of the self-consciousness leads up to the point at which it
has  «survived this struggle».8 On this basis, the interpretation of the
struggle shifts its focus: The question is then no longer which one of
the  two  subjects  has  faced  the  threat  of  death,  but  rather  what
surviving this struggle means for the subject. Hegel’s answer is very
clear:  Being  the  winner  of  the  struggle  is  not  so  much  a  sign  of
braveness but rather what causes the subject to fail. The subject has to
realise that in as much as it has destroyed its counterpart, its being
certain of its own self-concept – which was supposed to be fulfilled
when  winning  the  fight  –  has  become questionable.  «This  trial  by
death however», Hegel states,  «does away with the truth which was
7 HEGEL 2003 § 5 Addition. 
8 HEGEL 1977, 114. 
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supposed  to  issue  from  it,  and  so,  too,  with  the  certainty  of  self
generally.»9 In the context of the fight to the death, the subject fails in
so far as the other that it  has killed can no longer approve its  self-
concept.  When  killing  the  other,  the  subject  inherently  kills  the
condition of possibility of conscious certainty of itself. 
The conclusion that the self-consciousness draws from its survival
must be seen in the light of this loss of its self-certainty. Hegel says: «In
this experience, self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as
pure self-consciousness».10 The surviving subject realises that it must
maintain life in order to fulfill itself as a self-consciousness. It is this
discovery that represents the crucial turning point in the progression
of this history of experience. When encountering a human being the
next time, the subject will no longer seek conflict; quite the reverse, it
will seek submission. It will approve the superiority of the other and
recognise him as its lord. The reason for this self-imposed bondage is
that it guarantees the subject the stability of its self-concept. So long as
the bondsman approves the lord, he will in return receive recognition
from the latter. The bondsman is thus ready for submission because he
will, in return, receive at least the amount of recognition from the lord
that he needs in order to achieve a minimal form of self-certainty.11  
The submission of the bondsman is thus, according to my alternative
interpretation,  not  due  to  his  lack  of  bravery  but  must  rather  be
understood  in  the  light  of  his  dependency  upon  recognition.
Accepting  the  submissive  relationship  is,  from  the  bondsman’s
perspective,  a  result  from  his  experience  of  frustration:  He  has  to
realise that, in order to achieve certainty, he is dependent upon others.
Without  recognition,  however,  he  must  come  to  doubt  his  real
existence  in  the  surrounding  world:  Doesn’t  he  actually  live  in  a
condition of invisibility? Hegel describes this condition elsewhere as
«waking […] dreaming».12 When talking of invisibility, Hegel brings a
9 HEGEL 1977, 114.
10 HEGEL 1977, 115.
11 Cf. also Paul Redding for the argument that the bondsman is willing to submit in return
for a form of self-certainty (REDDING 2009, 106).
12 HEGEL 1986, 199.
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description  into  play  that  is  also  used  frequently  in  discussions
regarding contemporary social theory in order to address the social
exclusion of subaltern subjects. Without the recognition of others – this
is the core idea in both Hegel and contemporary social theory – people
are  endangered  to  drop  out  of  the  circle  of  those  counted  as  the
members of a society.13 
What is at stake in the struggle for recognition, as we are now able to
conclude,  is  not  so  much the  protagonists’  physical  life,  but  rather
their  ‘being-in-the-world’.  What  Hegel  wants  to  show  us  when
transitioning to the lord and bondage relation is that the development
of this relationship results from the very fear of losing this being-in-
the-world.  The  «absolute  Lord»14 that  makes  the  bondsman’s
consciousness surrender, according to my subaltern interpretation, is
not so much the fear of physical death, but rather the fear of social
death. The bondsman gets to feel what social death means once he has
killed the  other  and is  left  behind without  recognition.  Hegel  thus
says:  «In  that  experience  it  [self-consciousness]  has  been  quite
unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything
solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations.»15 Experiencing
the  dissolution  of  one’s  own  existence  as  described  by  Hegel  here
means transitioning to the experience of social invisibility as a result
from  the  loss  of  self-certainty.  According  to  my  subaltern
interpretation, the bondsman represents the very figure that reveals
how existential our dependency upon recognition is. He would rather
accept a disregarding form of recognition that enables him to reach at
least some form of self-certainty than not being able to achieve any
self-certainty at all. 
One will certainly want to object at this point that I have so far only
reconstructed half of what Hegel says. And indeed his thoughts are,
eventually,  meant  to  sublate  the  aforementioned  asymmetry  of
recognition. The argument at the core of  the lordship and bondage
13 On invisibility cf. HONNETH 2001 and BAUMAN 2003.
14 HEGEL 1977, 117. 
15 HEGEL 1977, 117.
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dialectic says: In so far as the lord has to realise that being recognised
by someone he despises is worth nothing, he ends up in an «existential
impasse».16 Recognition  relationships,  according  to  this  thought,
contain a potential for emancipation, since they aren’t  satisfying for
the  priviledged  agent  unless  a  symmetrical  equality  between  both
agents  gets  established.  Based  on  this  assumption,  Hegel  then
concludes that recognition relationships can only be realised in mutual
and symmetrical relations.
I think that Hegel’s conclusion is wrong. There are many ways to
obstruct the dissolution of the lordship and bondage relation, but this
is not even my point: I think that his argument simply does not work.
Let  us  remember  the  self-concept  with  which  the  agent  who  later
becomes the lord faces up to his counterpart: He is convinced at this
point  to  be  superior  to  the  other.  Believing  in  his  own superiority
necessarily means regarding the other as inferior. Put otherwise: The
lord’s  self-concept  depends  on  his  being  in  an asymmetrical  social
relationship with the other, and the bondsman’s submission approves
this self-concept. There is just no reason for him to doubt or alter it.
Hegel  argues  that  the lord’s  disregarding the bondsman devaluates
the  recognition of the latter and thus leaves the lord unsatisfied. The
error he commits is that he presumes what is yet to be shown: The
failure that Hegel speaks of only makes sense if the subject seeks the
recognition  of  someone  equal  but  has  to  realise  that  the  only
recognition it receives comes from someone inferior, and that it thus
does not find what it is looking for. But the subject of this history of
experience does not actually seek the recognition of someone equal – it
seeks the recognition of its superiority by someone inferior, and this is
exactly the kind of recognition it receives from the bondsman. So in his
aim to achieve certainty in his self-concept by being recognised by the
bondsman,  the  lord can indeed be  successful.  His  disregard of  the
bondsman does not necessarily entail a devaluation of his recognition.
Quite the opposite: The bondsman’s recognition consists in the very
gesture of certifying his own inferiority and thus confirming the self-
16 KOJÈVE 1980, 19.
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concept of the lord.
Up to this point, my argument was that the lordship and bondage
relationship  contains  an  asymmetry  of  recognition  that  is  not
necessarily doomed to failure. In the next step, I would like to show
that this relationship does not simply depict a random empirical fact,
but is rather socio-ontologically fundamental to sociality as such. The
structure of the lordship and bondage relation being inherent in every
intersubjective  relationship  becomes  clear  when  considering  our
communicative relationships. The reciprocity of speech and response,
understood as an exchange of recognition rather than a mere exchange
of information, contains the very form of asymmetrical dependency
that Hegel thought of with the figure of the bondsman. The reason for
this lies in the diachrony of our communicative relations: Speech and
response cannot take place at the same time. They must come after
each other for otherwise we would be exposed to but a babel of voices.
So the mutuality of recognition can only be established step by step.
Every and any process  of  recognition must  begin  with  a  unilateral
advance  of  recognition:  One  subject  recognises  another  subject
without being able to know at this point whether it will in return itself
receive recognition from the other subject. In order to achieve mutual
recognition,  one  subject  has  to  take  the  risk  of  first  unilaterally
rendering  recognition.17 Let  us  make  this  clear  by  reference  to  an
example: Greeting someone and the other person’s greeting in return
can be considered a mutual process of recognition in which the agents
communicate that they are of importance for one another. In order to
achieve mutuality, one subject has to initiate the communication and
greet first. It thus renders an advance of recognition without knowing
whether its recognition will be returned. Even more: In the moment in
which the subject addresses another, the latter is no longer a random
other; it becomes a significant other whose response has authority and
weight.  The  initiation  of  communication  comes  along  with  the
unequal situation in which the subject that speaks first is much more
dependent upon the subject it addresses than the other way around.
17 Marcel Hénaff argues in a similar way (HÉNAFF 2010, Part II).
Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017)
Asymmetrical Reciprocity                                                                               83
Neither does the addressed subject necessarily have to greet in return,
nor  can  the  subject  that  speaks  first  just  ignore  a  disrespectful
response, since it has awarded the other with a certain authority. This
asymmetrical dependency is not empirically contingent but rooted in
the very structure of communication as such. It thus cannot simply be
sublated by the participants. Even if the two subjects have promised
each other in advance that they will greet one another, this promise
does not guarantee that in the moment of communication the other
will  actually greet in return. It  is the asymmetrical  structure of the
communication  process  that  is  indicative  of  a  socio-ontological
interpretation  of  the  bondsman  figure.  A  subject  that  addresses
another subject in order to receive recognition renders an advance of
recognition. It recognises the other as someone who is as such worth
being recognised, and at the same time as someone whose recognition
it would like to receive. But a subject can never know for sure whether
it  will  actually  receive  the  recognition  it  is  seeking;  therefore,
addressing another creates  a situation of  asymmetrical  dependency.
The relation between the subject that addresses and the subject that is
being  addressed  equals  that  of  the  bondsman  and  the  lord.  What
prevails in both instances is an asymmetry of recognition. The result of
my  alternative  interpretation  of  Hegel’s  thoughts  is  thus  that
recognition and asymmetry are  not  necessarily  contradictory.  Quite
the reverse, they are equiprimordial in so far as they form the basis of
our intersubjective communication relations.
2. The Asymmetry of Responsibility: Levinas and the
Figure of the Hostage
Hegel’s  point  of  departure  is  the  addressing  subject.  Levinas’
philosophical signature,  however,  is to start from the subject that is
being addressed. In asking what it means to be someone’s addressee,
responsivity  is  the  register  that  then  comes  into  focus  when
contemplating social relations. Levinas’ social philosophy is arranged
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around the figure of the hostage.18 It  first appears in an essay from
1967  entitled  Language  and  Proximity;  in  his  subsequent  writings,  it
becomes more and more prominent before finally occupying centre
stage in his late work Otherwise than Being. The figure of the hostage is,
on the one hand, designed to reveal a morality that is fundamental to
social relations. On the other hand, Levinas uses it to make clear that
this morality is rooted in an ineluctable asymmetry. His core idea is
that  the  source  of  our  morality  is  not  the  subject’s  potential  for
reflection  –  be  it  in  the  sense  of  using  rules  of  sagacity,  of
universalising guiding principles or of orienting oneself by hierarchies
of values – but rather its  exposition to alterity. In order to understand
this exposition, we must take a closer look at Levinas’ phenomenology.
What does it mean to encounter another human being? 
For  Levinas,  the  primal  scene of  intersubjective  encounters  is  the
situation  of  the  face-to-face.  He  contemplates  this  situation  as  an
essentially communicative scene in which an addressing subject and
an addressed subject face one another. What fascinates Levinas about
the face-to-face situation is the mutual and unveiled gaze into the face
of  another  human  being.  Levinas’  fascination  for  this  situation  of
mutual gaze is easy to comprehend when considering the difference
between looking into a ‘living face’ as opposed to a ‘portrayed face’.
The gaze at  a  portrayed face –  be  it  a  painting,  a  photograph or  a
mask – remains uninterrupted. The colour, texture, tone and shade of
the eyes can as leisurely be perceived as the pores and wrinkles of the
skin or the contoures of the eyes, nose and cheeks. The portrayal of a
face can thus be perceived piece by piece. This is not the case with the
living face – it does not allow us to dwell, our gaze is being perturbed.
It is hard to look the other in the eye without doing something. For
Levinas, this is due to the fact that the other is able to reverse the gaze
relation. While the portrayed face silently tolerates the gaze, the other
can himself look at us. And the gaze of the other demands a gesture: a
smile, casting down one’s eyes, or a grimace. We are of course free to
18 «[…] man must be thought from the condition or incondition of hostage […]» (LEVINAS
2006, 68).
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refuse these gestures and to just look the other motionless in the eye
– but the fact that this costs us an exceptional effort only bears witness
to the demand of the other. Levinas thus states:  «The Other imposes
himself as an exigency».19 The question – and the concern of Levinas’
philosophy – is what it means to be affected by this demand. Its basic
structures can best be reconstructed by virtue of the three meanings of
the French word répondre: 
(i) “Répondre à qn.” as “respond to sb.”: Levinas contemplates the
subject as a responding subject. His basic proposition is that we cannot
leave  the  demand of  the  other  unanswered,  for  in  the  moment  of
confrontation  we cannot  act  as  if  nothing  were  happening.  We are
forced,  rather,  to  somehow react  to  the  other’s  demand.  «It  is  that
discourse», says Levinas,  «that obliges the entering into discourse.»20
Even remaining silent is a response to the demand of the other. Saying
nothing does not mean doing nothing, for it means to disregard or
ignore the other. There is no way of evading the other’s demand. The
demand of the other cannot be neutralised: Refusing a response is still
a reaction that confirms the very demand that it is trying to reject.21
(ii) “Répondre de qc.” as “to answer for sth.”: When in everyday life
we speak of taking over responsibility for something, we refer to acts
of which we consider ourselves to be the originators, given we have
acted voluntarily and not under constraint.  The concept of freedom
thus seems to outline the condition under which we are able to take
over responsibility. How about our responsibility when the demand of
the other forces us to respond? Can we then still claim responsibility
for  our  response?  Levinas  answers  this  question  starting  from  the
concept of «invested freedom».22 He uses this concept to show that the
subject not being released from its responsibility despite being forced
to respond is actually a characteristic of the face-to-face-relation. The
subject must in fact take over responsibility for something of which it
19 LEVINAS 1979, 87.
20 LEVINAS 1979, 201.
21 As an example, cf. PEPERZAK 2012, 4: «Any response changes the preceding speaker into a
listener, who, in turn, responds to the responder.»
22 LEVINAS 1979, 84. 
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is  neither  the  origin  nor  the  beginning.  Levinas  speaks  of  a
«responsibility  for  the  other,  for  what has  not  begun in me».23 The
reason why this is a case of responsibility is that the subject is indeed
forced to respond; but what and how it responds is up to the subject
alone. We may speak of being ‘forced’ to give a certain response in
particular  situations  of  everyday  life;  this  is,  however,  a  phrase  to
express  that  we  have  actually  decided on  a  certain  response.  The
demand  of  the  other  always  leaves  the  subject  the  possibility  of
freedom within a certain unfreedom, and this is why Levinas can say:
«The will  is  free  to  assume this  responsibility  in  whatever  sense  it
likes; it is not free to refuse this responsibility itself.»24
(iii) “Répondre de qc. devant qn.” as “to answer sth. before sb.”: The
last step of Levinas’ thoughts is to make clear that the demand of the
other does not only force to take over responsibility for one’s response,
but also to frame this response in moral terms. His proposition is that
our social relationships always appear in the light of morality. In order
to illucidate this idea, I would like to draw on the historical event that
has  deeply  influenced  Levinas’  thinking:  the  persecution  and
extermination of European Jews by the National  Socialists.  Levinas’
proposition must be understood in its full radicality: Even among the
Nazis, morality cannot have been entirely suspended. What the Jews
had  to  go  through  when  entering  the  camp can  be  interpreted  as
attempts  to  neutralise  the  normative  demand  coming  from  them.
Taking away their clothes, shaving their heads and tattooing a number
into  their  skin  would  then  have  to  be  understood  as  attempts  to
transform the individuals into a uniform mass of bodies as soon as
they arrived – bodies that  were supposed to appear as nothing but
things. From this perspective, the internment ritual would have to be
regarded  as  a  practice  of  dehumanisation,  aiming  to  suspend  the
normative demand that came from the enslaved and to disconnect any
moral  consciousness  on  the  perpetrators’  side,  so  as  to  enable  a
23 LEVINAS 1978, 125. 
24 LEVINAS 1979, 218-9. Cf. also Derrida:  «This responsibility that assigns freedom to us
without leaving it with us, as it were – we see it coming from the other. » (DERRIDA 2005,
231-2).
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ruthless  extermination  procedure.  We  know  from  many  survivers’
reports that all these attempts of dehumanisation were, to some extent,
doomed to failure: Humans can be treated as if they were things, but
they  cannot  actually  be  turned  into  things.25 Put  otherwise:  It  is
possible to disregard the demand of the other, but it is impossible to
suspend it. The ongoing desire of the camp wardens to degrade and
torture the inmates despite their already miserable situation can thus
be understood as  evidence for  the  impossibility  of  neutralising  the
morality of alterity. From this perspective, the torment of the inmates
would not just be a hollow form of sadism but rather it would bear
witness to the persistence of the moral consciousness the perpetrators
were unable to get rid off, despite all efforts to dehumanise the other.
Their immorality would thus need to be understood as the irreducible
morality of alterity because it still relates to this register, even if in a
negative form.
Levinas was not (or not primarily) interested in such a perspective
on the perpetrators. Whenever he seems to be speaking of the camp,
his  perspective  is  that  of  the  persecutees.  But  his  thoughts  on  the
subject  matter  are  nonetheless  surprising.  He  writes  that  the
responsibility  for  the  other  goes  so  far  as  to  the  subject  being
responsible even «for its persecutor».26 This thought that may seem a
little disturbing at first can be interpreted in different ways. One may
argue  that  what  Levinas  is  thinking  of  is  not  really  the  National
Socialist  perpetrators,  but  rather  the  fundamental  communication
structure,  namely  being  haunted  by  the  demand  of  the  other.  An
argument against this interpretation is, however, that Levinas’ theory
must prove itself specifically in extraordinary situations, given that the
proposition of the morality of alterity is supposed to actually be socio-
ontologically  fundamental.  For  this  reason,  I  think that  we have to
understand  Levinas’  thought  in  the  sense  that  the  victims  of  the
25 Cf. Robert Antelme who speaks of the executioner as someone powerless, for his only
power is the power of murder. This  means that  «He can kill  a  human being,  but he
cannot turn him into something different» (ANTELME 1987, 305). This thought has been
theoretically tidied up  by Avishai MARGALIT (1996). 
26 LEVINAS 1978, 126.
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National  Socialist  persecution  cannot  secede  from  being  morally
exposed to their perpetrators. Levinas’ dictum of the «impossibility of
killing» may clarify this idea.27 I believe that the way this statement
must  be  understood is  that  one cannot  take  another  one’s  life  and
declare it a ‘neutral’ killing, even if the other used to be one’s own
torturer. Because of their moral exposition, human beings cannot but
understand violence as ‘justified’ or ‘unjustified’ revenge, ‘legitimate’
or ‘illegitimate’ self-defense or as ‘rightful’ or ‘unrightful’ liberation.
Being exposed to the demand of the other makes it impossible for us
to  contemplate  social  relationships  other  than  in  the  normatively
loaded vocabulary of morality and immorality. 
Returning to the point from where we started, we can now better
understand  as  to  why  the  figure  of  the  hostage  is  emblematic  for
Levinas’ thought. The other human makes us their hostage in so far as
his demand engages us morally. Of course this does not mean that the
other makes us do the right thing per se. Quite the opposite – Levinas
says  that  the  face  of  the  other  is  also  «inviting  us  to  an  act  of
violence».28 What is crucial is that we cannot but try to justify violence
against others. This makes clear that our relationships with others can
only be understood in the light of morality. Morality doesn’t spring
from  a  devotion  to  the  other  in  an  empathetic,  compassionate  or
generous way,  but  rather  from the visitation by the  other.  It  is  not
based upon a relation of mutual equality and of symmetrical exchange
between  two  parties,  but  rather  on  the  relation  of  a  unilateral
asymmetry by way of which the subject finds itself as inherently in the
grip of morality. Levinas thus states:  «The responsibility for another,
an unlimited responsibility which the strict book-keeping of the free
and  non-free  does  not  measure,  requires  subjectivity  as  an
irreplaceable hostage.»29
27 LEVINAS 1979, 199.
28 LEVINAS 1985, 86.
29 LEVINAS 1978, 124.
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3.  Asymmetrical  Reciprocity:  From  Hegel  to  Levinas
and Back
In the aforegoing paragraphs I have reconstructed Hegel’s theory of
recognition and Levinas’ theory of responsibility. I have argued that
both Hegel and Levinas reveal a fundamental asymmetry at the basis
of social relations.  In the following, I would like to argue that both
asymmetries  are  mutually  intertwined.  In  doing  so,  I  will  follow
Derrida’s proposition that the relation between Hegel and Levinas can
be  described  as  «transcendental  symmetry  of  two  empirical
asymmetries».30 In  order  to  make  this  proposition  plausible,  I  will
show that both thinkers’ theories each contain an empty space that can
be filled by the other. The leading question for my argumentation will
be: In how far do the asymmetry of recognition and the asymmetry of
responsibility merge in the figure of asymmetrical reciprocity? 
Let  us  first  take  another  look  at  Hegel.  The  empty  space  of  his
thinking  becomes  specifically  clear  in  his  description  of  the
«movement  of  recognition»  that  precedes  his  reflections  on  the
dialectic  of  lordship and bondage. Hegel  describes it  as  a threefold
process that begins with the subject coming out of itself, its attempt to
supersede, and, lastly,  its return into itself.31 What is crucial for my
argumentation in this  paper is  the way in which he introduces  the
second  subject  after  this  process.  «Now,  this  movement  of  self-
consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has in this way
been represented as the action of one self-consciousness, but this action
of  the  one has  itself  the  double  significance  of  being both its  own
action and the action of the other as well. [...] Thus the movement is
simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses.»32 Hegel
thus stresses the necessity of describing the search for recognition as a
twofold activity. But in just adding the other subsequently, he reduces
30 DERRIDA 1978,  157.  Adriaan  T.  Peperzak  comes  to  a  similar  conclusion  in  his
contemplation of Hegel and Levinas, namely that a social relationship can be described
as «twofold or chiastic asymmetry» (PEPERZAK 2000, 161). 
31 HEGEL 1977, 111.
32 HEGEL 1977, 111-2.
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him to a behavioral double that is not affected by the behaviour of the
other, but rather acts in the exact same way. Put otherwise: Because
Hegel describes the activity of both subjects as «double movement», he
loses sight of the fact that what one subject does inherently affects the
other, and that the other has to cope with this. We can thus state that
what is characteristic of Hegel’s account is its  aperspectivity – he does
not distinguish between the perspective of the addressing subject and
that of  the addressed subject.  What therefore remains unthought is
what it means for a subject to be confronted with the other subject’s
dependency upon recognition.  Put  otherwise:  Hegel  teaches  us  the
meaning of the desire for recognition, but disregards a description of
what it means to be confronted with this desire.
Levinas’ theory of responsibility allows for filling the empty space
just outlined, in so far as the demand of the other can be described as a
confrontation with the desire for recognition. It is interesting in this
context that in an essay from 1978, Levinas describes the  «search for
recognition by the other man in Hegel» as one of the few moments in
the history of philosophy in which the alterity of the other appeared.33
He  elsewhere  speaks  of  the  «way  the  Other  has  of  seeking  my
recognition» and makes thus clear that his philosophy is a change of
perspective in giving priority to thinking about what it means to be
affected  by  the  dependency  upon  recognition.34 If  we  understand
Levinas’  theory of  responsibility  as  an answer to Hegel’s  theory of
recognition, it becomes clear that the desire for recognition can, with
Levinas, be understood as a call for response. The reason for this is
that  the  demand  that  is  at  the  core  of  Levinas’  thought  can  be
interpreted  as  the  most  fundamental  way  in  which  the  desire  for
recognition, as posited by Hegel, articulates itself. In so far as any kind
of answer confirms, to some extent, the call it is responding to, giving
a  response  can  be  considered  the  most  fundamental  form  of
confirming the desire for recognition. Levinas’ theory of responsibility
33 LEVINAS 1982, 119.
34 LEVINAS 1996, 70. Simon Critchley also argues along these lines:  «Ethical experience is,
first  and  foremost,  the  approval  of  a  demand,  a  demand  that  demands  approval.»
(CRITCHLEY 2007, 16).
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can thus be interpreted as the essential flip side of Hegel’s theory of
recognition.
What  I  have  outlined  above  shows  how  far  the  asymmetry  of
recognition transforms into an asymmetry of responsibility. The first
part  of  my  argumentation,  the  asymmetrical  reciprocity  of  social
relations, has thus been established. What remains to be shown in a
second step  is  how  far  the  asymmetry  of  responsibility  transforms
back into an asymmetry of recognition. It is this transformation that
now reveals an empty space in Levinas’ thinking. Just as Hegel focuses
unilaterally  on  the  desire  for  recognition,  Levinas  concentrates
unilaterally  on  the  necessity  of  responsibility.  His  subject  merges
entirely in its responsibility for the other. Levinas thus misses the fact
that by way of answering, the subject does not only avow for the other,
but also inherently conceptualises itself coming from the other. When
stating  in  Otherwise  than  Being  or  beyond  Essence:  «This  book  has
exposed my passivity, passivity as the-one-for-the-other; […] The-one-
for-the-other goes to the extent of the-one-being-hostage-for-the-other.
In its identity invoked the one is irreplaceable, and does not return to
itself […]»,35 Levinas misses the fact that every and any form of taking
over  responsibility  also  contains  a  conception  of  self  and  thus  a
projected return to oneself.
I would like to clarify this point by referring to Hannah Arendt. 36 In
the paragraph «The Disclosure of the Agent in Speech and Action» in
Vita Activa, she reflects about how a person’s individuality expresses
itself. For Arendt, it is not so much what one thinks of oneself and
claims publicly that determines «who somebody is»,37 but rather what
our speech discloses involuntarily about ourselves. When speaking, we
always  have  to  take  a  stand  in  relation  to  the  plurality  of  human
beings. How we deal with the demand of the other – be it a child, a
friend,  a  stranger  –  in concrete  situations reveals  much more about
who we are than the abstract ideals that we have of ourselves. In the
35 LEVINAS 1978, 141.
36 On the relation between Levinas and Arendt, cf. TOPOLSKI 2015.
37 ARENDT 1958, 178.
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grapple of speech we show who we are, by means of how we respond.
A  response,  however,  is  not  meaningful  as  such;  it  becomes
meaningful  once  others  have  recognised  it  as  a  response.  Arendt
contemplates speech as having to be stored in «stories», for this is the
only  way  in  which  the  particularity  of  how  we  act  can  be
comprehended in  its  full  complexity  and in  which stereotypes  and
character masks can be avoided.38 
Arendt’s reflections on self-disclosure make clear how the circle of
the twofold asymmetry of  social  relations  becomes complete in the
giving of an answer. Starting from Levinas’ reflections, we saw how
the dependency upon recognition diagnosed by Hegel transforms into
the subject’s being exposed to responsibility. By referring to Hannah
Arendt, we then saw how being exposed to responsibility transforms
back  into  the  dependency  upon  recognition.  The  subject  thus
permanently sways between being a bondsman and being a hostage; it
is subjected not only to its call for recognition, but also to its gift of
responsibility. This twofold subjection shows that subjects bring about
their social existence in relation to one another. The proposition of the
asymmetrical  reciprocity  of  social  relations  designates  an
intersubjective process that moves from the asymmetry of recognition
to the asymmetry of responsibility and back. 
Shining  a  light  on  this  process  was  the  last  step  of  my
argumentation.  Before  finishing  this  paper,  I  would  like  to  briefly
draw on one last question: What does considering sociality as being
based upon the idea of asymmetrical reciprocity change for the theory
of intersubjectivity? I would like to answer this question by reference
to  Iris  Marion  Young’s  reflections.  In  her  essay  Asymmetrical
Reciprocity, she argues that the idea of symmetry is deeply rooted in
our ideas of intersubjectivity.39 This can be seen in everyday situations
whenever we prompt others to think about something from a different
perspective («Just think about what this must feel like for X!»). Young
sees  the  problem  of  this  idea  in  the  fact  that  it  considers
38 ARENDT 1958, 184f.
39 YOUNG 2001.
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intersubjectivity on the basis of the reversibility of social perspectives.
This  idea is  reflected in those philosophical  theories  that  argue for
subjects as being able to participate in a  ‘view from nowhere’ in which
they can transgress their particular stance to something more general.
The symmetry of social relations is, in this tradition, based on all social
agents being able to take a general stance. The same is true for the
tradition in which the symmetry of social relations is based upon the
idea of a ‘view from somewhere’. The general stance, however, is in this
tradition  not  situated  beyond  our  world  but  much  rather,  it  is
understood as part of it, in so far as it draws on ethical life and the
norms, values and ideals of a community. Although the general stance
is here no longer abstract but based in the lifeworld, the assumption
that intersubjectivity is  based upon taking a supraindividual stance
remains dominant also in this tradition.
Young criticises both traditions as being unable to account for the
plurality of social relations. Neither can social perspectives simply be
exchanged,  nor  would  this  even  always  be  desirable.  Taking  over
somebody else’s perspective might in fact often be usurping and blind
for their specific perspective. To give an example, Young speaks of the
dispute between white and black feminists in the second wave of the
feminist movement.40 While the former wanted to form a union with
the  latter  on  the  basis  of  the  universal  subject  woman,  the  latter
pointed out that there were severe differences between them that ran
the risk of being made invisible by way of the universalisation of the
subject woman. Starting from this example and others, Young argues
that  social  relationships  are  always  local  and  require  situated
evaluations that account for the differences between social agents. Put
otherwise:  Successful  sociality  does  not  necessarily  require  that  we
would think or act in the same way if in the situation of the other, but
rather that we give us and others the chance to act out of a specific
situatedness.  In  this  perspective,  intersubjectivity  is  thus  not  based
upon taking a supraindividual stance in which particular perspectives
overlap,  but rather upon the gathering of particular standpoints that
40 YOUNG 2001, 210f.
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differ in  their  perspectives.  Asymmetrical  rather  than  symmetrical
relations  are  at  the  basis  of  successful  sociality.  In  Young’s  words:
«Through  such  dialogue  that  recognizes  the  asymmetry  of  others
people  can  enlarge  their  thinking  in  at  least  two  ways.  Their  own
assumptions and point of view become relativized for them as they are
set  in relation to those of  others.  By learning from others  how the
world and the collective relations they have forged through interaction
look  to  them,  moreover,  everyone  can  develop  an  enlarged
understanding of that world and those relations that are unavailable to
any of them from their own perspective alone.»41
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